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Abstract With the commercialization of agriculture, women
are increasingly disadvantaged because of persistent gender
disparities in access to productive resources. Farmer collective
action that intends to improve smallholder access to markets
and technology could potentially accelerate this trend. Here,
we use survey data of small-scale banana producers in Kenya
to investigate the gender implications of recently established
farmer groups. Traditionally, banana has been a women’s crop
in Kenya. Our results confirm that the groups contribute to
increasing male control over banana. We also analyze nutri-
tional implications. While male control over banana revenues
does not affect household calorie consumption, it has a nega-
tive marginal effect on dietary quality. We demonstrate that
the negative gender implications of farmer groups can be
avoided when women are group members themselves. In the
poorest income segments, group membership even seems to
have a positive effect on female-controlled income share.
Some policy implications towards gender mainstreaming of
farmer collective action are discussed.
Keywords Gender . Collective action . Market access .
Agricultural technology . Household food security and
nutrition . Kenya
Introduction
Women make essential contributions to agriculture and rural
livelihoods. While their access to productive resources, such
as land and capital, is often constrained, women play a
large role in food crop production (Quisumbing et al.
1995; Udry 1996; Ibnouf 2011). Especially in Africa,
women also tend to control the income derived from
semi-subsistence crops (Njuki et al. 2011). However,
gender relations change with changing conditions. Agri-
cultural commercialization is often associated with a
decline in women’s control, because cash crops usually
fall into the male domain. Commercialization is some-
times also associated with the adoption of new technol-
ogies, which may further reduce the role of women.
Such developments were analyzed in previous research
(von Braun and Webb 1989; Sorensen 1996; Doss 2001;
Negin et al. 2009; FAO 2011). Furthermore, it was
shown that the loss of women’s control may have a
negative marginal effect on household nutrition, al-
though income gains from commercialization may out-
weigh this negative marginal effect (von Braun and
Kennedy 1994).
More recently, there has been a renewed policy focus
on linking smallholder farmers to markets and emerging
value chains (Wiggins et al. 2009). In this connection,
promotion of collective action has gained popularity, in
order to help farmers reduce transaction costs and increase
their bargaining position vis-à-vis companies and traders
(Markelova et al. 2009; Shiferaw et al. 2011). The forma-
tion of farmer groups or cooperatives is often assisted by
development organizations. Determinants of farmer par-
ticipation in collective action and impacts on the degree of
commercialization, prices, and incomes have been ana-
lyzed in the recent literature (e.g., Barham and Chitemi
2009; Bernard and Spielman 2009; Fischer and Qaim
2012). Yet, the gender implications have hardly been
examined up till now.
The impact of collective action on gender roles can
be manifold, depending on the social context, the type
of collective activities, and the rights that women have
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within the groups. A few studies have explored gender
issues in collective action for natural resource manage-
ment (e.g., Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen 1998; Agarwal
2000; Pandolfelli et al. 2008). Mayoux (1995) and Gotschi
et al. (2009) have analyzed gender equity and mainstreaming
within rural farmer groups and cooperatives, while Barham
and Chitemi (2009) have examined linkages between the
gender composition of groups and marketing perfor-
mance. We are not aware of any previous study that
has explicitly looked at the impact of agricultural pro-
duction and marketing groups on women’s control over
output and income and related implications for household
nutrition.
We address these questions by analyzing the situation of
small-scale banana producers in Kenya, where farmer
groups were recently established to promote technological
innovation and commercialization. In Kenya and other East-
African countries, banana is a semi-subsistence food crop
and has traditionally often been in the women’s sphere of
control (Qaim 1999; Smale and Tushemereirwe 2007; Beed
et al. 2012). However, due to rising urban demand, banana
is also gaining importance as a cash crop. This as such may
reduce the role of women. We suppose that farmer groups
may accelerate this trend, but that appropriate mechanisms
can possibly prevent undesirable gender outcomes. We also
analyze nutritional effects in terms of household calorie
consumption and dietary quality.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. In the
next section, we discuss linkages between gender, agri-
cultural commercialization, and collective action from a
theoretical perspective. This allows us to derive concrete
research hypotheses. Subsequently, we describe the sit-
uation of banana producers in Kenya and the survey
data, before discussing regression approaches and esti-
mation results. The last section concludes with some
policy implications.
Background and research hypotheses
Theoretical framework
In many regions of Sub-Saharan Africa, a traditional
gender division exists in agriculture, which can be based
on crops, tasks, or both (Doss 2001; McPeak and Doss
2006). Cash and export crops are often found to be
male-dominated, because men are considered the family’s
major cash earners. Subsistence crops mostly fall under
the women’s sphere of control (Njuki et al. 2011). The nature
of this gender division can be complex and depends on the
specific socio-cultural context. Generally, gender relations are
dynamic and can change as a response to commercialization
and innovation (Sorensen 1996; Ibnouf 2011).
Fafchamps (2001) developed a model of intra-household
resource allocation that is of particular relevance here. In
this model, productive household members allocate their
total time to labor for own income-generating activities,
labor provided to others, and leisure. An individual is wil-
ling to work on the partner’s agricultural plot if he or she
receives compensation that is at least equal to what could be
earned in the off-farm labor market. When markets are
competitive, household resources are allocated efficiently.
However, this only holds when constant returns to scale of
production are assumed. With decreasing returns to scale,
efficiency can be increased when each individual is an
independent producer. With increasing returns to scale, on
the other hand, efficiency can be increased if production is
centralized. Whether increasing or decreasing returns to
scale apply depends on various factors. When external trans-
actions increase through commercialization, more intensive
use of purchased inputs, and adoption of new technologies,
increasing returns to scale are often observed (Wiggins et al.
2009). Production is then likely to be centralized in the
hands of the male household head, because of his better
access to land, inputs, and other productive resources.
While centralization may increase efficiency, the distri-
bution of the gains may not be equitable. Markets for labor
and land may not be complete. Thus, for individuals it is
difficult to identify a wage rate that determines the oppor-
tunity cost of time, which leaves room for bargaining over
the size of the compensation for the labor provided to other
household members. The conditions under which a woman
will agree to provide labor depend on whether she is better
off with or without intra-household cooperation. The utility
level outside the household depends on income sources,
asset endowments, laws, and customs regarding the rights
and obligations of separating household members. These
factors also determine the level of bargaining power in
negotiating intra-household compensation via an explicit
or implicit threat to leave the household. Compensation for
women may be low when their outside options are poor.
Against this background, technology adoption and agricul-
tural commercialization may weaken the role of women and
their control over production and income. This could also
affect household nutrition. While higher household income
through commercialization usually has positive effects on
overall consumption, income controlled by women is more
likely to be spent on food and other basic household goods
(Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; Quisumbing et al. 1995).More-
over, when men take over production, more food may be sold
and the revenues may not be equitably distributed.
Farmer groups that market collectively and promote the
adoption of new technologies may potentially reinforce this
loss of women’s control. On the other hand, a gender-
sensitive group design may have the opposite effect. Be-
cause of their multiple responsibilities in the farm and the
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household, women often have high opportunity costs of
time, which lowers their incentive to participate in markets.
Groups that facilitate market access may therefore be very
helpful. However, group activities can be time-consuming
themselves, lowering the incentive for women to participate
(Weinberger and Jütting 2001; Meinzen-Dick and
Zwarteveen 1998). Moreover, except for pure women’s
groups, group leadership is often male dominated, making
it more difficult for women to assert their interests. Even if
women join a group, they are often less likely to adopt
innovations, which may be due to the lack of complemen-
tary services, such as credit or extension. Collective action
that fails to adequately understand and address gender issues
may worsen women’s position in the long run (Padmanabhan
2008; Gotschi et al. 2009).
Collective action in the Kenyan banana sector
In Kenya, banana is a semi-subsistence food crop, produced
under low-input regimes (Beed et al. 2012). Due to rising
demand in urban areas, the marketed share has been increas-
ing recently. A few banana producers are able to sell at local
markets or to small shops, but the majority sell their harvest
to local traders at the farm gate (Fischer and Qaim 2012).
Because of remoteness, poor infrastructure, market informa-
tion asymmetries, perishability, and bulkiness, smallholders
have very limited marketing alternatives. This also contrib-
utes to low bargaining power vis-à-vis traders.
Recognizing the problems of low banana yields and
farmers’ limited access to markets on the one hand, and
the increasing commercial potential of the crop on the other,
efforts have been started by different development agencies
to improve the situation through dissemination of better
planting material and related measures. One of these initia-
tives was jointly launched by Africa Harvest and Techno-
Serve – two international non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). Since 2003, Africa Harvest and TechnoServe have
been working together in encouraging banana farmers in
Central Kenya to establish self-sustaining groups in order
to facilitate access to clean planting material, technical ex-
tension, and output markets. Up till now, several thousand
small-scale banana growers have become organized in such
farmer groups (Fischer and Qaim 2012). These groups in
Central Kenya are also the focus of our empirical analysis.
One benefit of these groups is improved access to tissue
culture planting material, which is propagated in the laboratory
and thus free from pests and diseases. Linkages between farmer
groups and tissue culture laboratories and nurseries were estab-
lished through Africa Harvest. Groupmembers can collectively
procure plantlets, thereby reducing transaction costs. Related
technical advice is provided by NGO field officers in group
training sessions. Tissue culture plantlets are higher yielding,
but they also require more inputs such as water and fertilizer
(Kabunga et al. 2012). These other inputs are usually not
purchased collectively. Likewise, most of the groups do not
provide credit. Collective marketing was introduced by Tech-
noServe. Group participants regularly deliver their bananas to
designated collection centers, where they are directly sold to
urban wholesale traders for a collectively negotiated price.
Training sessions on record keeping, negotiation, and other
business skills are also provided. Group membership is indi-
vidual; both men and women are allowed to join. The groups
have an elected leadership, which is mostly male dominated.
Research hypotheses
Building on the theoretical framework outlined above, we
formulate three concrete research hypotheses, which we test
for the case of banana farmers in Kenya. We have argued
that with increasing returns to scale, male household heads
tend to centralize crop production. This tendency may be
reinforced through farmer collective action aimed at exploit-
ing new marketing and technological opportunities. There-
fore, the first hypothesis is.
Hypothesis 1 Farmer groups contribute to increasing male
control over crop production and revenues.
Until the new constitution, passed in 2010, women in
Kenya could not inherit land. Women also have little access
to other productive resources, so their outside options are poor
and their bargaining position within the household is probably
weak. Male control of crop revenues may lead to lower food
consumption and dietary quality. Hence, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2 Male control over crop revenues negatively
affects household nutrition.
To what extent collective action changes gender roles
will depend on various factors, including the question as
to who within the household is actually member of a farmer
group. Considering gender-specific constraints in terms of
accessing markets, women are likely to benefit from groups
if they become members themselves. Since banana has
traditionally been a women’s crop in Kenya, female group
membership may potentially also reduce the tendency of
men taking over control. Hence, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3 Female membership in farmer groups
increases women’s probability of keeping control over rev-
enues and positively affects female-controlled income share.
Data and sample characteristics
We conducted a survey of banana farm households in Central
Kenya between April and July 2009. We focused on those
districts where the two NGOs, Africa Harvest and
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TechnoServe, had been promoting the establishment of farmer
groups since 2003 (see above). In particular, we purposively
selected the districts of Muranga, Nyeri, Embu, and Meru.
These are all located within the same agro-ecological zone,
have similar access to road infrastructure, and are classified as
high-potential banana-growing areas. In these districts, we
selected banana growers who are members of farmer groups
as well as non-members, using a stratified random sampling
procedure. We first obtained a list of all 240 banana farmer
groups in the four districts from the NGOs. Out of these 240
groups, 17 groups were randomly selected in different sub-
locations. From each group, around 12 member households
were randomly selected, resulting in a total of 201 group
member observations. In the same 17 sub-locations, we also
randomly sampled 137 non-members. As these non-member
households are located in areas where farmer groups operate,
they are exposed and might potentially be affected by spill-
overs from group activities. Hence, we further identified 10
sub-locations in the same four districts where no banana
farmer groups operate yet. In these control regions, we ran-
domly selected another 106 banana growers. Thus, the total
sample consists of 444 households. It is representative of
members and non-members of banana farmer groups in the
central highlands of Kenya.
For the design of the sampling framework and initial local
contacts with farmer groups, we were assisted by Africa
Harvest and TechnoServe. The survey itself and the household
interviews were conducted together with a small team of
independent local enumerators that we recruited for this pur-
pose. Household heads – mostly together with their spouse,
when a spouse was living in the same household – were
interviewed using a carefully pre-tested questionnaire. The
interviews covered farm and household characteristics, details
of the banana business, other sources of income and credit,
food and non-food consumption, asset ownership, and other
information. Questions about male and female control of
banana production and revenues were asked, as is further
explained below. Household-level food consumption data
were elicited using a 7-day recall for 94 food items, differen-
tiating between food consumed from home production, mar-
ket purchases, and gifts. Food items were reported in local
measures and converted to kilograms using appropriate con-
version factors. For the nutrition analysis, calorie contents of
food items were derived from the World Food Dietary As-
sessment System (FAO 2010). While our data are suitable for
deriving household level measures of calorie consumption,
more detailed analysis of intra-household distribution or nu-
tritional outcomes were not possible (de Haen et al. 2011).
Table 1 compares sample characteristics for selected var-
iables between group members and non-members. With
average farm sizes of less than 4 acres, banana farmers can
be characterized as typical smallholders. Group members
are more specialized in banana production. This is likely a
result of facilitated access to tissue culture planting material,
which has allowed farmers to significantly expand their
banana plantations over the past few years (Fischer and
Qaim 2012). In general, members seem to be better off than
non-members in terms of income, education, and productive
assets. The income difference may in part be caused by
collective marketing, but the other differences probably
rather reflect self-selection of better-off farmers into groups.
This will be accounted for in the statistical analysis below.
In terms of gender, 15 % of all group members are
females from female headed households. Yet, women can
also become group members when they are from a male
headed household, which was observed for 30 % of all
group members. Thus, 45 % of all group members are
female, whereas 55 % are male. In principle, also more than
one person per household can formally join the groups, but
this was not observed in our sample.
Regression approaches and results
In this section, we want to test the three research hypotheses
explained above, in order to better understand how group
membership affects gender roles and household nutrition.
One issue in the statistical analysis is potential selectivity
bias, because households (and individuals) self-select into
farmer groups. Thus, observed differences in gender roles
between member and non-member households may not
necessarily be due to group membership alone, but can also
be the result of preexisting heterogeneity. We will deal with
this issue through various approaches, including instrumen-
tal variable (IV) techniques and inverse probability weight-
ing with propensity scores, as is further explained below.
Control over banana production and revenue
Membership in farmer groups improves access to banana
technology, training, and output markets, which increases
expected profits and may lead to men taking over the banana
enterprise. One possible way of analyzing this is by looking
at the allocation of family labor. There is a traditional gender
division of labor, with men usually carrying out the work for
the initial establishment of banana plantations (e.g., land
preparation, planting) and women being responsible for
plantation maintenance and harvesting. In our sample,
households that are members in a farmer group spend more
labor days for banana production and marketing than non-
member households. This is due to somewhat more inten-
sive production patterns and a higher quantity of output to
be marketed. With 57 %, the share of female labor in banana
is higher in member households than in non-member house-
holds, where the female labor share is 48 %. However, this
alone cannot be interpreted as an increase in female control,
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because carrying out the work is not equivalent to decision
making.1
In order to get a better sense of decision making, survey
respondents were asked who within the household controls
banana production, output (e.g., how much to sell), and
revenues.2 Using this information, we categorized as fol-
lows: (1) husband alone makes decisions, (2) husband is
major decision maker after consulting with wife, (3) wife is
major decision maker after consulting with husband, and (4)
wife alone makes decisions. We further aggregated these
categories to distinguish between male, (1) + (2), and fe-
male, (3) + (4), decision making and control.
Table 2 gives a descriptive overview. For control of pro-
duction, no significant difference can be observed between
members and non-members of farmer groups. While in about
50 % of the sample households, banana production is con-
trolled by men, group membership does not seem to have an
influence. This is different for the control of output and
revenues. While among non-member households, in around
one-third of the cases, banana output and revenues are con-
trolled by men, this proportion is significantly higher among
member households. The results in Table 2 suggest that farmer
groups contribute to men taking over control of the banana
enterprise. But this is not proof of a causal relationship. The
observed differences between group member and non-
member households could also be due to self-selection. For
instance, households in which banana output is already con-
trolled by men may be more likely to join a group.
To further analyze the net impact of group membership
on control in the banana enterprise, we exploit the fact that
the farmer groups were established and had started their
collective marketing activities at different points in time.
The left-hand panels in Fig. 1 show the proportion of group
member households in which men control the banana enter-
prise, disaggregated by groups with longer or shorter histo-
ries of group marketing activities. A rising trend is observed,
suggesting that male control increases with the time of
participation in farmer groups.3 The same trend over time
is not observed among non-member households, as can be
seen in the right-hand panels of Fig. 1. This analysis sup-
ports our first hypothesis that farmer groups contribute to
male control over banana production and revenues.
Effects on nutrition
The centralization of banana production does not necessar-
ily imply negative effects for women’s position or house-
hold welfare, because there may be some form of intra-
household compensation. While we are unable to examine
such intra-household compensation due to data constraints,
we analyze the impact of group membership and male
Table 1 Selected household characteristics
Variable Description Members Non-members
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Diff.
Ln income Natural logarithm of annual income in KShs per adult equivalent 4.12 0.06 3.70 0.05 ***
Non-farm share Share of income derived from non-farm activities 0.38 0.02 0.31 0.02 ***
Land holding Size of land owned in acres 3.22 0.21 2.05 0.18 ***
Productive assets Value of productive assets in 1000 KShs 173.16 24.98 53.81 8.32 ***
Banana plot size Total size of banana plots in acres 0.44 0.03 0.19 0.02 ***
Marketed surplus Share of marketed surplus to total banana production 0.62 0.02 0.50 0.02 ***
Cash crop Production of cash crops other than banana (e.g., tea, coffee) (dummy) 0.61 0.03 0.66 0.03 ***
Schooling Years of schooling of household head 9.27 0.27 7.82 0.28 ***
Age Age of household head in years 55.99 0.92 51.95 0.98 ***
Household size Household size in adult equivalents 4.54 0.13 4.05 0.11 ***
Female head Female headed household (dummy) 0.15 0.03 0.18 0.02
Female membership Female membership in a producer marketing group (dummy) 0.45 0.04 – –
Observations 201 243
*, **, and *** denote significance of mean difference at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively
1 In fact, more female family labor in banana production and marketing
adds to women’s daily workload and may potentially entail a reduction
in time available for household activities such as cooking and child
care. In the survey, we did not collect details of women’s time alloca-
tion in non-farm activities.
2 Such questions may potentially lead to unreliable answers if the male
household head alone is asked. As mentioned above, we tried to
include spouses into the interviews wherever possible. Moreover, field
enumerators were carefully trained and sensitized. Thus, we reduced
the probability of strategic responses.
3 The rising trend could also be the result of more and more households
with male control of banana joining farmer groups over time. However,
in our sample, 94 % of the member households had joined their groups
from the date of formal group establishment. Hence, later entry into
existing groups is rare.
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control on household nutrition. In particular, we estimate
regression models of calorie consumption and dietary qual-
ity, including group membership and male control of banana
production and revenues as explanatory variables.
Undernutrition is widespread in Kenya and other
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, nutritional
deficiencies are commonplace due to low dietary diversity
and quality (Ecker and Qaim 2011). In the sample
Table 2 Gendered control over
banana activities
*, **, and *** denote signifi-
cance of difference at the 10 %,
5 %, and 1 % level, respectively
Variable Members Non-members Diff.
Proportion of households in which men control production 0.50 0.52
Proportion of households in which men control output 0.43 0.30 ***
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Fig. 1 Proportion of households in which men control banana produc-
tion, output, and revenues. Notes: The left-hand panels refer to group
member households, whereas the right-hand panels refer to non-
member households. For member households, the sample is split
according to the number of years of group marketing activities. Mem-
ber households of groups that had been established but had not yet
started collective marketing at the time of the survey are in the zero
years category. Each data point shows the proportion of households in
which men control banana production, output, or revenues. Fitted
values are predictions based on simple linear regressions with propor-
tion of male control as dependent and years of group marketing as
independent variables (CI: confidence interval). Non-member house-
holds are split in the same way, using the number of years of marketing
activities of groups that exist in the same sub-locations. Households in
sub-locations without existing groups are in the zero years category.
The rising trend in the left-hand panels indicates that male control
increases with the time of membership and participation in farmer
groups. On the right-hand side, the same trend is not observed. This
comparison suggests that the increase in male control among member
households is actually due to group membership rather than other
factors that would have influenced non-member households, too
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households, mean per capita calorie consumption is
2178 kcal per day; 52 % fall below recommended calorie
levels, 34 % even fall below average calorie requirements
of 1700 kcal. This is in line with official statistics for
Central Kenya (KNBS 2008). For the regression analysis,
we use calorie consumption per adult equivalent (AE) as
dependent variable, as this takes better account of house-
hold composition and calorie needs (Deaton 1997). On
average, households in our sample consume 2512 kcal per
AE and day. In order to capture dietary quality, we build
on an approach that was recently used by Babatunde and
Qaim (2010) and measure the calories stemming from
fruits, vegetables, and animal products, which are impor-
tant sources of micronutrients. On average, in the sample
households fewer than 30 % of the calories (733 kcal) are
coming from such higher-value products. There are no
significant differences between members and non-
members in farmer groups, neither in terms of total mean
calorie consumption nor in terms of dietary quality.
In the regression analysis, we need to account for
possible issues of endogeneity due to self-selection into
farmer groups. We test for this possibility by using an
IV approach. As potential instruments for group mem-
bership we identified mobile phone ownership, distance
to roads, and participation in other social groups, such
as church or savings associations. These variables are
significantly correlated with membership of farmer
groups (Fischer and Qaim 2012). For distance to roads,
we additionally use a square term as instrument, be-
cause road distance affects group membership in a non-
linear way.4
To be valid, the instruments also need to be uncorrelated
with the outcome variables. To test for this and eliminate
possible indirect effects through the instruments’ influence
on group membership, we took advantage of our sampling
frame. In particular, we estimated models of calorie con-
sumption and dietary quality, including the instruments but
only using observations from the sub-locations where no
farmer groups operate yet (households not exposed to farm-
er groups). We found no indication for significant direct
effects of the instruments, except for participation in other
social groups, which affects dietary quality (Table 6 in the
Appendix). Hence for this model we did not use participa-
tion in other social groups as an instrument. Additional tests
with the full sample confirmed that there are no problems of
overidentification.
Using these instruments, we ran the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test of endogeneity. The F-values of 3.25 (p0
0.36) and 0.70 (p00.71) suggest that the null hypothesis
of no correlation between group membership and the error
term cannot be rejected in the calorie consumption and
dietary quality model, respectively. We conclude that there
is no bias stemming from unobserved factors. Hence, for the
analysis we use group membership as observed, instead of
instrumenting this variable.
However, there may potentially be other sources of
bias caused by omitted variables. In the descriptive statis-
tics above we saw that members in farmer groups are
better off than non-members in terms of asset ownership.
One way of avoiding estimation bias is to include differ-
ent asset variables into the calorie consumption and die-
tary quality models directly. Another way, which we
prefer to keep the models more comprehensible, is inverse
probability weighting (Nichols 2007). For this, we first
derive propensity scores for group membership, using a
probit model. In this probit, we include assets – such as
the number of large livestock, the value of agricultural
equipment, and ownership of motor vehicles – and other
socioeconomic covariates. Following Nichols (2007), in-
verse probability weights are then calculated as:
For members:




wC ¼ 11 lð Þ
where l is the propensity score, and p is the proportion of
the sample receiving group “treatment”. We rescaled the
weight for members by p1pð Þ to preserve proportions in
treatments. The weights are used as analytical weights in the
regressions.
Table 3 reports the estimation results. As expected,
income has a positive effect in both models. We use a
log-transformation of the income variable, because the
calorie-income relationship is non-linear. The non-farm
income share has a significant positive impact on calorie
consumption, but not on dietary quality. The same holds
true for farm size (land holding). Each additional acre of
land owned increases daily calorie consumption by 49 kcal
per AE. On the other hand, banana plot size and the
production of cash crops other than banana have a posi-
tive effect on dietary quality. Cash crop production
increases daily calorie consumption from high-value
foods by 83 kcal per AE.
4 Variables capturing male control over production, output, and reve-
nue may potentially also be correlated with the error term. Instead of
directly including group membership into the nutrition regressions, one
could also think of structural models where a set of exogenous varia-
bles explains group membership in a first stage, which explains male
control in a second stage. The endogenous male control variables
would then be used as explanatory variables for calorie consumption
and dietary quality in a third stage. Unfortunately, we could not
identify proper instruments to estimate such structural models.
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Group membership as such does not seem to have a signif-
icant impact on calorie consumption. Nor does male control
over production, output, and revenue affect total calorie con-
sumption. However, male control over output has a positive
and male control over revenues has a negative and significant
effect on dietary quality. Holding other things constant, male
control over cash revenues decreases calories consumed from
high-value products by 160 kcal per AE and day. This is
plausible, because the cash spending behavior of males and
females is often different (Hoddinott and Haddad 1995). Wom-
en tend to care more for a balanced diet and nutritional diver-
sity, which is reflected in the way they allocate cash resources
for consumption. The combined effect of groupmembership on
nutrition is therefore ambiguous. On the one hand, group
membership increases the tendency of male control over rev-
enues with a negative marginal effect on nutritional quality. On
the other hand, group membership contributes to higher house-
hold income with a positive effect on nutrition. Hence, search-
ing for mechanisms to realize the positive but avoid the
negative effects is important from a broader welfare and equity
perspective. This is addressed in the following section.
Female group membership and income share
We now analyze how the tendency towards male control can
potentially be reduced or avoided. For this, we estimate
several regression models with different dependent varia-
bles. In the first model, the dependent variable is a dummy,
taking a value of one if women control banana revenues and
zero otherwise. This is estimated as a probit. In the second
model, the share of female-controlled banana income to total
household income, measured in percentage terms, is taken
as dependent variable. Both cash revenues and subsistence
income are counted here. We suppose that a larger female-
controlled share is associated with a stronger role of women
in decision making. In the third model, the female-
controlled share of home-consumed bananas in total subsis-
tence income is used, and in the final model, the female-
controlled share of banana cash revenues in total household
cash revenues is taken as dependent variable.
As explanatory variables, we use membership in ba-
nana farmer groups, regardless of who in the household is
registered as member. Furthermore, we use a dummy for
female membership, next to a number of control variables.
Both membership and female membership may potential-
ly be endogenous, for which we test using IV regressions.
As above, we use mobile phone ownership, distance to
paved roads, and participation in other social groups as
instruments for group membership. Female membership is
instrumented with age and education of the female house-
hold head or the spouse of the male head, which proved to
be significant determinants. Table 7 in the Appendix,
which shows regressions for the subsample of households
not exposed to groups, confirms that these instruments do
not influence the outcome variables directly. One excep-
tion is road distance and distance squared, which we
therefore omit as instruments in the total household in-
come share model. Results of the Durban-Wu-Hausman
test show that group membership and female membership
are not endogenous (Table 4). To control for potential
Table 3 Determinants of
household nutrition
*, **, *** denote significance at
the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels,
respectively. Standard errors
(SE) are robust and cluster cor-
rected by sub-location. The de-
pendent variables are total
calories consumed and calories
consumed from high-value
products, both measured in kcal
per AE and day
aDistrict dummies included in
estimation to control for district
fixed effects
bEleven out of 444 observations
were dropped, because no ba-
nanas were harvested in the sur-
vey year
Calorie consumption Dietary quality
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Group membership 101.89 112.03 −20.46 31.69
Male control over banana production −40.21 93.22 8.43 47.99
Male control over banana output 59.70 221.09 148.05* 79.11
Male control over banana revenues −35.08 218.88 −159.65** 61.33
Ln income 169.60*** 55.27 143.94*** 33.48
Non-farm share 567.29*** 200.72 33.02 68.79
Land holding 48.70*** 16.07 8.41 7.76
Banana plot size 13.30 152.84 242.90* 137.45
Marketed surplus 207.83 141.74 −5.15 63.1
Cash crop 119.77 78.45 82.77*** 23.74
Schooling −4.98 10.43 2.38 4.36
Age −3.90 3.81 0.42 1.33
Household size −292.10*** 19.67 −105.26*** 13.1
Constant 2,960.01*** 286.08 589.80*** 148.31
District fixed effectsa Yes Yes
Observationsb 433 433
R-squared 0.42 0.45
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omitted variable bias, we use an inverse probability
weighting procedure, as explained above.
The estimation results for all four models are shown
in Table 5. Group membership has a negative effect on
the probability and share of female-controlled banana
income in total income, which further supports our first
hypothesis. Holding other things constant, the female-
controlled share decreases by 8–11 percentage points.
However, female membership offsets this negative effect,
as indicated by the significantly positive coefficients in
similar absolute magnitude. That is, women who are
themselves members of a banana farmer group have a
higher likelihood of keeping control over banana output
and revenues, also leading to a higher female-controlled
share in total income. These results support our third
research hypothesis.
There are some further interesting results in Table 5. In
order to analyze differential gender effects by household
income, we include interaction terms between group
membership and income quintiles into the models. The
first quintile includes the poorest 20 % of households. The
fifth quintile with the richest 20 % is excluded and there-
fore constitutes the reference. Noteworthy is that most of
the coefficients of these interactions terms are positive,
and some of them are significant. This implies that group
membership has a less negative effect on the share of
Table 4 Test statistics for IV regressions
Outcome variables Group membership Female membership
Test of endogeneity Overidentifying
restrictions
Test of endogeneity Overidentifying
restrictions
F-value P-value Chi2 P-value F-value P-value Chi2 P-value
Female control over banana revenues 0.09 0.77 0.25 0.97 0.73 0.40 0.79 0.37
Female share in total household income 0.34 0.57 0.30 0.58 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.94
Female share in total subsistence income 0.61 0.44 2.56 0.47 0.78 0.39 0.20 0.65
Female share in total cash income 0.01 0.92 0.11 0.74 0.22 0.64 1.29 0.26
Table 5 Determinants of women’s control over banana revenues and share in household income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control over revenues
(Probit)
Share in total household
income
Share in total subsistence
income
Share in total cash
income
Group membership −0.85*** (0.30) −8.74** (3.48) −10.11** (3.71) −11.08*** (3.62)
Female membership 1.19*** (0.26) 10.88*** (3.47) 9.83*** (3.29) 10.34*** (3.47)
Group membership*1st income quintile 0.22 (0.34) 15.17*** (5.43) 11.68** (4.49) 16.78*** (5.39)
Group membership*2nd income quintile −0.46* (0.27) 4.01 (3.02) 0.52 (2.97) 3.68 (2.94)
Group membership*3rd income quintile 0.15 (0.40) 4.41 (3.55) 3.41 (3.42) 3.79 (2.56)
Group membership*4th income quintile 0.75*** (0.26) 3.27 (2.53) 5.06* (2.93) 7.14*** (2.39)
Land holding −0.01 (0.02) −0.46** (0.19) −0.79*** (0.20) −0.33* (0.18)
Banana plot size −0.40 (0.26) 6.15 (4.24) 2.72 (3.61) 8.89** (4.09)
Household size 0.03 (0.03) −0.37 (0.36) −0.14 (0.31) −0.34 (0.29)
Female self-employment 0.01 (0.22) −2.94 (1.74) −4.74*** (1.61) −3.23* (1.75)
Female outside employment 0.20 (0.25) −3.00** (1.42) −2.77 (2.08) −1.98 (1.98)
Participation in women’s groups −0.33* (0.17) 1.35 (0.88) −0.29 (1.34) 0.61 (0.73)
Constant 0.42 (0.36) 6.03*** (1.53) 8.99*** (2.15) 3.71*** (1.29)
District fixed effectsa Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observationsb 432 432 432 432
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.14 0.25 0.16 0.26
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are robust and cluster corrected
by sub-location. The income shares used as dependent variables in models (2) to (4) are measured in percentage terms.
a District dummies included in estimation to control for district fixed effects
b Twelve out of 444 observations were dropped because there was no female household member
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female-controlled income in lower income households, as
compared to the richest quintile. The coefficients for the
poorest quintile are especially large; they are even some-
what bigger than the group membership coefficients in
absolute terms, implying that the negative gender effect of
group membership is avoided completely. If women in
these poorest households are group members themselves,
their role and income control even seems to increase
significantly.
Farm size is negatively related to female-controlled income
share, which is probably due to a higher degree of commer-
cialization and centralization on relatively larger farms. Ba-
nana plot size has a positive effect on female-controlled cash
income share (model 4), underlining the traditional impor-
tance of women in the banana crop. Table 5 also includes
two dummy variables capturing female employment in non-
agricultural activities. Female self-employment takes a value
of one if the relevant female (female household head or spouse
of male head) has an own non-agricultural micro-business.
Female outside employment takes a value of one if the female
is employed in non-agricultural activities outside the house-
hold. The coefficients for these dummies are positive but
insignificant in model (1). They are negative and some of
them are significant in models (2) to (4). This is plausible:
whenwomen have income sources outside of agriculture, their
focus on the banana enterprise is somewhat reduced.
Conclusion
With the commercialization of agriculture, women are in-
creasingly disadvantaged because of persistent gender dis-
parities in access to productive resources. When new
marketing or technological opportunities emerge, farm pro-
duction is often centralized under men’s control. This can
have negative implications for women’s ability to generate
income as well as for overall household welfare. Farmer
collective action, which has recently received renewed pol-
icy attention as a mechanism to improve access of small
farms to markets and technologies, could potentially accel-
erate this trend.
We have analyzed data from small-scale banana pro-
ducers in Kenya to investigate the gender implications of
farmer groups, which were recently established to pro-
mote innovation and commercialization in the banana
sector. Traditionally, banana has been a women’s crop in
Kenya. Our results confirm the hypothesis that farmer
groups contribute to increasing male control over banana
production and revenues. Furthermore, while male control
over revenues does not affect total calorie consumption, it
has a negative marginal effect on dietary quality. This
suggests that the gains from centralization are not shared
equally within the household. Finally, we have shown that
the negative gender implications of farmer groups can be
avoided when women are group members themselves. In
the poorest income quintile, group membership even
seems to have a positive effect on female-controlled in-
come share.
We have tried to control for issues of endogeneity and
self-selection, but a perfect elimination of potential bias is
difficult with the cross-section data available. The collection
and use of panel data would be an interesting avenue for
future research in this direction. Too broad generalizations
should also be avoided because of the situation-specificity
of the results. Apart from considerable heterogeneity be-
tween countries and regions in terms of socioeconomic
conditions and gender roles, group structures, objectives,
and details of collective activities may differ substantially
from case to case.
Nonetheless, some cautious broader conclusions may
be permissible. First, collective action and other inter-
ventions set out to promote market access for small-
holders can change gender relations to the detriment of
women. Second, gender mainstreaming can avoid and
reverse this trend. In particular, if women are members
in farmer groups themselves, this can contribute to
empowerment and a better position in intra-household
bargaining. But female membership is not only a ques-
tion of legal rules. The formation of farmer groups is
often facilitated by outside field officers, who are most-
ly male and may have a preference to communicate
with male farmers. Moreover, due to high opportunity
costs of time and more severe market access constraints,
the benefit-cost ratio of group participation may be
lower for women than for men. Groups that are better
targeted to the needs of women farmers may increase
the likelihood of female participation. For instance,
group-organized microcredit schemes, input acquisition,
or transport services may ease some of the specific
constraints.
In conclusion, farmer groups have the potential to pro-
mote smallholder commercialization in a gender equitable
way. But this potential has not yet been fully tapped in the
case analyzed here. Further research is necessary to gain a
deeper understanding of the trends in different settings and
to help design mechanisms towards gender mainstreaming
in collective action.
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Appendix
Table 6 Determinants of
household nutrition (subsample
of farmers not exposed to farmer
groups)
*, **, *** denote significance at
the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels,
respectively. Standard errors
(SE) are robust and cluster cor-
rected by sub-location
Calorie consumption Dietary quality
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Mobile phone (dummy) −37.93 197.49 −44.19 53.39
Distance to paved road 1.09 54.51 −25.11 18.61
Distance squared 0.90 3.07 1.84 1.31
Social participation (dummy) 30.76 120.05 145.69* 67.84
Male control over production −83.99 137.50 −29.99 41.90
Male control over output 9.28 353.91 256.09** 95.94
Male control over revenues −31.38 355.44 −124.02 85.19
Ln income 326.03*** 79.82 281.97*** 50.81
Non-farm share 621.74 364.25 281.15 200.89
Land holding −3.45 50.20 10.78 23.72
Banana plot size −157.75 589.97 276.52 282.02
Marketed surplus 424.94 325.46 −253.72 148.42
Cash crop 205.34 198.64 −34.83 61.77
Schooling −16.32 19.21 1.32 6.25
Age −4.13 5.05 0.79 3.38
Household size −320.54*** 44.76 −82.80** 27.98
Constant 2,517.43*** 757.42 −48.91 253.70
District fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 105 105
R-squared 0.58 0.65
Table 7 Women’s control over banana revenues and share in household income (subsample of farmers not exposed to farmer groups)
Control over revenues Share in total household
income
Share in total subsistence
income
Share in total cash
income
Mobile phone −0.01 (0.12) −0.01 (1.73) −2.11 (5.40) 1.18 (3.87)
Distance to paved road 0.01 (0.03) −1.17** (0.43) 0.16 (0.84) −0.38 (0.33)
Distance squared −0.00 (0.00) 0.05* (0.02) −0.03 (0.05) −0.01 (0.03)
Social participation 0.11 (0.18) 0.38 (2.36) 0.60 (5.47) −1.18 (4.58)
1st income quintile −0.07 (0.28) 5.96* (3.18) 15.35* (7.08) 7.16 (4.00)
2nd income quintile −0.04 (0.26) 5.71 (3.35) 6.48 (4.81) 4.71 (2.57)
3rd income quintile −0.08 (0.24) 0.70 (0.98) 3.61 (4.57) −0.37 (0.80)
4th income quintile 0.03 (0.25) 1.88 (1.88) 1.59 (3.59) −1.35 (1.26)
Land holding −0.07 (0.28) 5.96* (3.18) 15.35* (7.08) 7.16 (4.00)
Banana plot size −0.04 (0.26) 5.71 (3.35) 6.48 (4.81) 4.71 (2.57)
Household size −0.08 (0.24) 0.70 (0.98) 3.61 (4.57) −0.37 (0.80)
Age of female 0.03 (0.25) 1.88 (1.88) 1.59 (3.59) −1.35 (1.26)
Schooling of female −0.07 (0.28) 5.96* (3.18) 15.35* (7.08) 7.16 (4.00)
Female self-employment −0.04 (0.26) 5.71 (3.35) 6.48 (4.81) 4.71 (2.57)
Female outside employment −0.08 (0.24) 0.70 (0.98) 3.61 (4.57) −0.37 (0.80)
Participation in women’s
groups
0.03 (0.25) 1.88 (1.88) 1.59 (3.59) −1.35 (1.26)
Constant 0.25 (0.48) 3.06 (8.54) 2.01 (13.81) 0.12 (8.79)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 101 101 101 101
R-squared 0.15 0.30 0.29 0.25
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are robust and cluster corrected
by sub-location
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